Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Power Systems & Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Electrical
Construction Company, dba K.E. Systems, Inc. :
Reply Brief of Defendant/Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jimi Mitsunaga; Attorney for Defendant & Appellant.
Eric C. Olson; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Power Systems and Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Electrical Construction Company, No. 880029 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/823

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

" ^ H COURT OF APPEAL<J
Bft,lrir
BRIEF
UTAH
^ ^
50
.-A 10
D

OCKET NO.

-£§Z£*Z9-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
POWER SYSTEMS & CONTROLS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case N o . 860071
vs •

Classification #14

KEITH'S ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, dba K. E . SYSTEMS,
INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

88-0029-CA

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
JUDGE LEONARD RUSSON PRESIDING

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for Defendant & Appellant
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

ERIC C. OLSEN
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
•Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

SEP 2 51986
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
POWER SYSTEMS & CONTROLS, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 860071
vs.
Classification #14
KEITH'S ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, dba K. E. SYSTEMS,
INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE
JUDGE LEONARD RUSSON PRESIDING

JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for Defendant & Appellant
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

ERIC C. OLSEN
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
•Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities

i

Argument

i

Conclusion

12

Certificate of Mailing

12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Brown vs. Johnson, 43 Utah, 134 P. 590 (1983) . .

1

Cahoon vs. Cahoon, 641 P2d 140 (Utah 1982 . . . .

9

Coronado Min. Corp. vs. Marathon Oil Co., 577 P
2d 957 (Utah 1978 . . ;

1 & 2

Ferree vs. Dorrick Co., 62 Wash. 2d 561, 383 P2d
900, (1963)

1

Hailey vs. Riley, 14 Idaho 481, 95 P686 (1908). .

1

Hoke vs. Stevens - Norton, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d
775, 375 P2d 743 (1962) . . .
Nolan vs. N.Y., N. H., and H. R. Co., 70 Conn
159, 39A 115 (1898)
Zions Properties, Inc. vs. Holt, 538 P. 2d
(Utah 1975)

1
1
9

Other authorities
Rule 52 (a), URCP

1

i

ARGUMENT
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P provides:
"In all actions tried upon the facts, without a
jury . • ., the court shall find the facts especially
and states separately its conclusions of law thereon . ."
In the present case, however, a number of the trial court
findings of fact are in reality conclusions of law. This
court is of course not bound by the lower court's conclusion
of law. Coronado Min. Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 577 P2d
957 (Utah 1978).

The Findings of fact which are in reality

conclusions of law cannot be given effect as findings even
though included with the Findings of Fact. Hailey vs.
Riley, 14 Idaho 481, 95 P. 686 (1908).

This court has held

before that the so called findings were merely a blending
of conclusions of fact and conclusions of law, interspensed
with some ultimate facts. Brown v. Johnson, 43 Utah
834, P590 (1983).
In determining the character of the finding, the court
will look to the substance thereof rather than its classification.

Conclusions drawn by the court in the exercise of

its legal judgment from facts found by it are conclusions of
law, although denoted findings of fact.

Nolan vs. N.Y.,N.

Y & H.R. Co., 70 Conn 159, 39A 115 (1898); Ferree vs.
Dorrick Co., 62 Wash. 2D 5761, 383 P 2d 900 (1963); Hoke v.
Stevens-Norton, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 775, 375 P 2d 743 (1962),
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and also the findings of insufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of fact is properly a conclusion of law
rather than finding of fact and is for this court to
decidef Coronado Min. Corp. vs. Marathon Oil Co. 577 P 2d
957 (1978).
FINDING OF FACT #10
This court should find that the trial court's No. 10
findings of fact is in reality a conclusion of law and
that this court is not bound by this conclusion of law of
the lower court.

Evidence in the transcript in fact

indicates the fact in this case is an incorrect conclusion
of law and it should be reversed. In the event this court
finds that the lower court's findings of fact No. 10 is
a finding of fact then this court should reverse the
lower court and find the evidence in the record does not
support this finding of fact. The lower court's findings
of fact No.10 states:
The contract was subject to the following conditions
agreed to both by PSC and K. E. Systems. "The first
purchase order is contingent upon HAFB's acceptance of
the equipment approval and conditions." The contract
did not contain any limit on the time in which o~ the
number of submittals by which PSC could seek HAFB
approval."
This statement is inaccurate because it is incomplete and
therefore not supported by the evidence in the record.
While it is true the contract did not spell out any limits
on the time in which or the number of submittals by which
PSC could seek HAFB's approval/ it is also true that the
contract between HAFB and K.E. Systems required that K. E.
-2-

Systems complete the manufacture and delivery of the
equipment within a twenty-two week period* PSC knew of this
twenty-two week deadline faced by K.E. Systems. (Transcript
P. 337, 554 thru 556)

Thus, PSC knew it had to obtain

the approval of HAFB within a very limited time and that the
number of submittals and the time it could use to gain an
approval were extremely limited.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 31
This finding of fact should be characterized
not in substance as a finding of fact but in actuality
as a conclusion of law. As suchf this court is free to
review the record and come to its own conclusion of law.
This conclusion of law reached by the lower court was
incorrect for the various reasons submitted below.

Even

if this court characterizes the lower courtfs findings of
fact No. 31 as a true finding of fact it is not substantiated by the evidence in the record.

The lower court

erred in its part in its findings of fact No. 31 in the
same manner and for the same reason as in its finding of
fact No. 10. Finding of Fact No. 31 reads as follows:
"By reason of the acts of K.E. Systems and PSC as set
forth above, a course of dealings was established
whereby (a) PSC would make a submittal, (b) K.E.
Systems would forward this submittal to HAFB, (c) HAFB
would review the submittal and would designate
approval or disapproval, (d) HAFB would then return
-3-

the submittal and cover sheet to K.E. Syustems and (e)
K.E. Systems would forward the reviewed submittal and
cover sheet to PSC for response to the disapproved
items in the resubmittal. A contract did not provide
the number of times PSC would be permitted to make
submittals and four submittals by PSC was not
unreasonable."
Againf PSC knew that K.E. Systems was under a strict
time schedule because of the contract between HAFB and K.E.
Systems.

Mr. Glendonf the representative of PSC received the

first submittal about the 11th or 12th of September, 1984.
Mr. Glendon was advised of the third rejection on the 26th
of October, 1984. (Transcript -00473)

Thus between the time

PSC received the first submittal and the time PSC received
the rejection of the third submittal by HAFB after approximately one and one-half months had expired, Mr. Sakai was
faced with the deadline for gettin

the project completed

and had seen three submittals provided by PSC and three submittals rejected.

To hold that a course of dealing had been

established and that PSC should be permitted to make another
submittal because of the contract between PSC and K.E.
Systems is not supported by the evidence and is completely
erroneous.
These findings of fact do not give effect to the
time constraints faced by K.E. Systems and the knowledge of
PSC of these time constraints.
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FINDING OF FACT NO. 11
The lower court erred in its findings of fact No. 11
which states:
"At the time that the contract was executed, PSC's
manufactures representativef (Data Site-Utah) "Data
Site" advises K.E. Systems that PSC would commence
the manufacture of the 500 kilowatt unit in order to
complete manufacture and delivery within the
twenty-two week period."
This fact was confirmed in a letter from PSC to K.E.
Systems dated September 11, 1984. Not only did Mr. Sakai never
explicitely authorize to commence manufacture of the five hundred kilowatt unit as stated in the findings of fact No. 11, but
Mr. Sakai specifically told PSC not to begin the manufacture
of the equipment until PSC had the approval from HAFB in its
hands. (Transcript 000554 and 555)

Thus, it should be found

that the evidence in the record does not support this
finding of fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 30
The lower court erred in part in its findings of fact
No. 30 in the same manner and

for the same reasons it

erred in its findings of fact No. 11. Findings of Fact No.
30 reads as follows:
"As of October 26, 1984, K.E. Systems was aware that
PSC was in the process of manufacturing the 500
kilowatt unit to be supplied in the contract."
Again the lower court erred in not completing this
finding of factr thus rendering it inaccurate and not
supported by the evidence of the record.
-5-

Mr. Sakai was aware that PSC was in the process of
manufacturing the five hundred kilowatt unit and explicitly
warned PSC not to begin the manufacture of this unit until
it had received the approval of HAFB.

The fact that Mr. Sakai

had no control over the activities of PSC with respect to the
manufacturing of the five hundred kilowatt unit coupled
with the fact that he specifically told PSC not to begin
the process of manufacture of the five hundred kilowatt unit
until PSC had the submittal approval in its hands
illustrates that PSC took it upon itself and assumed the
risk of manufacturing the unit without approval for its
submittals. Mr. Sakai should not be deemed to have assumed
that risk.
FINDING OF FACT NO. 26
The lower court erred in part in its findings of fact
No. 26. This finding states:
"That at no time prior to November 1, 1984, did K.E.
Systems advise PSCf or did PSC receive notice at (a)
The EPE submittal had een sent to HAFBf (b) the EPE
submittal had been approved by HAFB (c) the EPE
equipment had been ordered, (d) any reason existed for
the disapproval of the third PSC submittal other than
Clause (F) on the warranty, (e) disapproval of the
third PSC submittal required resubmittal within ten
days or (f) there existed any limitation on PSC's
ability to make further submittals."
With respect to part (f) of finding of fact 26, again
this finding was not complete and inaccurate and not
supported by the evidence in the record.

While it is true

that K.E. Systems did not specifically advise PSC that
there existed any limitation on PSC's ability to make
-6-

further submittals. The record clearly indicates that PSC
held itself out to have had significant experience in
dealing with government agencies, contracts and submittals
of the type involved in this dispute.
326)

(Transcript 325 and

In addition, it has been shown that PSC knew of the

time constraints and the twenty-two week deadline faced by
K.E. Systems. Thus the evidence of the case indicates that
PSC knew or should have known independent of any
communication from Mr. Sakai that PSC knew they had only a
limited time and a limited number of opportunities to gain
approval for the submittals in order to meet the twenty-two
week delivery schedule.

It was not necessary nor was it

required of K.E. Systems to point this out to PSC.
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 29 AND 36
Finding of Fact No. 29 is simply irrelevant. The
evidence in the records shows that three submittals had
been rejected by this time by HAFB. K.E. Systems had at
all times rendered strict compliance with the contract
between itself and PSCf but PSC breached the contract by
not submitting a submittal which had gained the approval
of HAFB. This breach by PSC had occurred before the fourth
submittal. K.E. Systems was not required under the contract
to submit any more of PSC's submittal to HAFB.
This also applies to finding of fact No. 36, which
states:
-7-

"On November 19, 1984, K.E. Systems instructed
HAFB to disregard any PSC submittal forward
directly to HAFB. The copy of the Fourth PSC
was then sent to K.E. Systems without review or
consideration."
Again, as the evidence on the record shows, PSC had already
breached its contract with K.E. Systems and therefore, any
actions by K.E. Systems after the breach by PSC Were irrelevant and should not have been made a finding of fact and
should not have been made a basis for the final conclusions
of law.
FINDING OF FACT NO. 37
With respect to the finding of fact No. 37 the
lower Court erred in that this finding was completely irrelevant
and should not have been used by any basis for a conclusion of
law.

Findings of Fact No. 37 states:
As of November 19, 1984, PSC was entitled to make
another submittal to HAFB in order to cure the
dissaproved items set forth in the completed cover
sheet to the third PSC submittal and thus fulfill its
condition to the contract".

This is a conclusion of law which is simply labeled
as a statement of fact and this Court should be free to
review the record without granting any deference to the
findings of the lower Court.

The record clearly supports

the finding that PSCf by this time, had breached its
contract with K.E. Systems and was not entitled to cure any
dissaproval by HAFB or to send in any more submittals to
HAFB through K.E. Systems. Even if this Court concludes
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that Finding of Fact No. 37 is a finding of fact this
findings of fact it is simply not supported by the evidence
in the record.
The total sum of the circumstances indicate

that

that PSC had already breached its contract with K.E.
Systems and it was not entitled to any assistance from K.E.
Systems or help in attempting to gain approval of any of
its submittals.
FINDING OF FACT NO. 41
The lower Court's findings of fact No. 41f is also a
conclusion of law labeled as a finding of fact. This court
may review the record without giving any deference to the
lower court finding and should hold that K.E. Systems was
at all times, reasonable in its actions with respect to PSC's
third and fourth submittals due to the fact that PSC breached
the contract between K.E. Systems by failing to obtain HAFB's
approval.

The rejections by HAFB support the fact that PSC

had breached the contract with K.E. Systems and K.E. Systems
was not required to deal with PSC after a rejection by HAFB
of the third submittal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW No. 3
The lower court erred in its conclusion of law No. 3.
The facts indicated in Cahoon vs. Cahoon 641 P2d 140, 144
(Utah 1982) , are simply inapplicable to the present case.
The extreme nature of Cahoony in factf argues against
applying to those facts to the record in this case. As
stated previously, this Court held in Zions Properties,
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Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319 (Utah 1975), that if there is
any interference with a performance of contract it must be
something that is so substantial that it could be
reasonably deemed to vindicate the other's refusal to
perform.

Although PSC complains about K. E. Systems1

interference with performance of its contract, the simple
fact of the matter is that PSC was unable to obtain
approval from HAFB due to PSC's failure to meet government
requirements.

This was solely under the control of and the

responsibility of PSC.

The record clearly demonstrates

that Mr. Stewart at HAFB, who was making the decisions as
to whether or not a submittal accepted or rejected was
acting independently of Mr. Sakai and K.E. Systems. (See
Transcript 705)
This is also true regarding Mr. Stewart's approval of
EPE's proposal. (See transcript page 705 & 706)

Mr. Stewart

made his decision based upon his own judgment and experience
regarding the specifications and warranties the government
required.

(Transcript page 706)

PSC trys to portray K.E. Systems as interfering with
its ability to obtain a contract and not providing it
sufficient information.

But as the records shows, Mr. Stewart

talked with Tom Glandon on several occasions.

Mr. Stewart

never prohibited Mr. Glandon from calling him.

Thus, the

information was always available to PSC to enable PSC to
conform its submittal and to gain HAFB approval.
transcript, page 707 through 709)
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(See

CONCLDSIONS OP LAW, NO. 4 and NO. 5
The lower Court erred in its conclusion of law No. 4
in holding that the acts of K.E. Systems constituted a
breach and violation of the duties and obligations imposed
by law upon K.E. Systems. The contract between K.E.
Systems and PSC had already been breached by PSC failing to
obtain approval of its submittal by the independent HAFB
personnel during the first three attempts. This is also
true of the lower Courtfs conclusions of Law No. 5. K.E.
Systems was not charged by law to assist PSC after PSCfs
third rejection. K.E. Systems did aid PSC in .its attempt
to gain approval of the first three submittals by HAFB. As
previously indicated, the transcript indicates that Mr.
Stewart was completely independent in his evaluation
proposals and rejections. PSC had tried three times and
had failed three times to gain approval of its submittals
and this consitituted a breach of contract.

The contract

had already been breached by the time K.E. Systems refused
to forward any further submittals to HAFB.
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 6
The lower Court erred in its Conclusions of Law No. 6
in that it was not K.E. Systems that breached the contract,
but, rather, it was PSC that breached the contract by its
failure to gain approval for its submittals.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding that K. E. Systems
wilfully interferred with PSC which interference substantially contributed to PSCfs failure to obtain HAFB
approval of PSC's submittals*

This Court should reverse

the lower court and hold that PSC, by its own acts, breached
the contract between itself and K.E. Systems. Furtherf
this court should grant the relief sought by the appellant
on its counterclaim.

^ J T M r MITSUNAGA
71
Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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